The
Human
Rights Act 1998
The Lord Chancellor introduced the Human Rights Bill 1998 into
Parliament on 23 October 1997. It incorporates into domestic law the rights and
liberties enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty to
which the United Kingdom is signatory but which until 2000 had no application in
domestic law. The Act received Royal Assent on 9 November 1998 and came into
force in October 2000.
The Act applies to Dover District Council as they are a public
authority. It makes it unlawful for them to violate the rights contained in the
European Convention on Human Rights. DDC pays lip service to the Act, but does
not heed it in practice.
Any person who is a victim of a violation can use the Human
Rights Act. A victim includes anyone directly affected by the actions, or the
inactions, of the public authority. Where there has been a breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights, or even where there is about to be, the
victim can take proceedings in court under the Human Rights Act. They may be
able to take judicial review proceedings, obtain an injunction to stop the
violation, force the public authority to take action or obtain damages and
compensation.
Although the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, it is still possible to take cases
to Europe.
Note: Before
the incorporation of the Convention, individuals in the United Kingdom could
only complain of unlawful interference with their Convention rights by lodging a
petition with the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The events surrounding Dover District Council’s unlawful
destruction of our bungalow were prior to
the Human Rights Act 1998, but their action did come under the
jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights (although
at the time I was not aware of this). However, the Council's Legal Department were
aware of my rights and their own obligations, but chose to ignore them.
The
Human
Rights Act
1998 ensures observance of the principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions
and denies the Council any right to deprive a person of their possessions except
in accordance with law.
The
Human Rights Act introduces an obligation on Dover District Council to act
consistently with the European Convention on Human Rights. It is evident that
Dover District Council’s continuing actions are disproportionate and violate
Article 8 of the Convention.
I
had a long-standing property right with which Dover District Council
interfered and its interference was both unlawful and disproportionate.
Public
authorities, which include local planning authorities by definition, are
prohibited from acting in a way, which is incompatible with any of the human
rights described by the Convention, Section 6(1),
unless legislation makes this unavoidable.
6.
Acts
of public authorities
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to
act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right.
If an authority acts in a
way, which is incompatible, then separate proceedings can be brought against it
under Section 7 (1).
7.
Proceedings
(1) A person
who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which
is made unlawful by section 6(1)
may:
(a) bring
proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or
tribunal, or
(b) rely on
the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,
Therefore the Act
creates rights of action and grounds of appeal whether civil or criminal by a
‘victim’ of the unlawful act.
Dover
District Council's Protocol for Good Practice in Planning Procedures 2003 says
it aims to ensure and to demonstrate that it takes its planning decisions openly
and impartially and for sound, justifiable planning reasons. (None of which
appear to have been the case in my situation) The same protocol quotes the Human
Rights Act 1998 Article 6 which is concerned with...and I quote from the
council's own website:
"Guaranteeing
procedural fairness in the determination of civil rights and obligations,
especially entitlement to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
an impartial and independent tribunal. These principles are at the heart of the
planning system. Should any councillors, staff or public have any queries
about the operation of the Protocol, they should contact the chief planning and
building control officer or the monitoring officer."
However,
in my particular case the opposite is true, because they have not taken their
decisions openly but often held meetings in secret. This has resulted in
unilateral decisions being made because I have not been given the opportunity to
put my side of the case. Consequently I have not received a fair hearing as
required by Article 6.
Nor
have the Council acted impartially but rather they have acted with blatant bias
and their own Professional Standards Investigator has confirmed this. In his
report he concluded that the Council’s planning and enforcement reports were
written in a style that presented them in a very favourable light and in so
doing presented me as being troublesome with my various applications and appeals
as having no, or limited, merit. The Investigator recorded this as maladministration.
The
Investigator also expressed concern that the planning departments conclusions
reached since 1984 were based on assumptions that were not sufficiently tested
and that contemporary evidence supporting residential use was ignored or glossed
over.
In section 6.10
of his findings the Professional Standards Investigator stated:
“After careful
consideration of all the files and documents relating to the history of this
site I have come to the conclusion that the Planning Committee reached the
decision to demolish the complainant’s home based on inaccurate and misleading
advice”.
He added at
6.11
“This was maladministration.”
The
Human Rights Act 1998, and in particular Article 6, is concerned with
guaranteeing procedural fairness in the determination of civil rights and
obligations, especially the entitlement to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. The Act puts the
rights of the individual first, on the basis that the rights of the individual
are paramount unless there is justification in the public interest.
Primarily
it is Article 8, Article 6 and Article 1 of the First Protocol that impact on
most planning situations.
ARTICLE
8:
Right to Respect for Private and Family Life.
Article 8 guarantees the substantive right of respect for a
person’s home.
1. Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
Article
6: The
Right to a Fair Trial.
Article 6 relates entirely to procedure
and it applies wherever there is a determination of a person’s ‘civil
rights’. These rights encompass property rights, thus affecting planning law.
Article 6 gives everyone the right to a fair
hearing, both criminal and civil. This not only means in the courts but also in
tribunals, inquiries and administrative decision making of a semi judicial
nature, which includes the planning decision making processes.
Article
1 of the First Protocol:
Protection
of Property.
This
guarantees a person the right of peaceful enjoyment of
their possessions, which includes their home and other land.
In my case the Council are denying that right and this amounts to an
interference of that right.
The Act states: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. No one shall be deprived of their possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The
Court has consistently held that the terms 'law' or 'lawful' in
the Convention do not merely refer back to domestic law but also relate to the
quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of the law.
In
many cases there is likely to be a significant overlap between Article 8 and the
First Protocol, Article 1. However, this right is wider than Article 8 in the
sense that it applies to the peaceful enjoyment of all of a person’s
possessions and not merely to his home. This could include land, curtilage
property, fixtures and fittings.
In
simple terms the Act requires that a person’s interests be balanced against
the interests of the community. This is something that is supposed to happen
with the present planning system, in particular the reports to Planning
Committees, but more often than not failing. Committee members should
specifically bear human rights issues in mind when reaching decisions on all
planning applications and enforcement action (but they don't!).
In
considering the application of Article 8 a 5-stage test can be applied:
-
Does a right protected by Article 8 apply?
-
Has an interference with that right taken place?
-
Is the interference in accordance with the law i.e. is there a legal authorisation for the interference?
-
Does the interference pursue a legitimate aim?
-
Is the interference necessary in a democratic society?
The
fourth stage of the test: Does the interference pursue a legitimate aim?
The
legitimate aims are listed in Article 8(2) and they are:
A decision
made by a public authority must not be irrational, or ‘unreasonable’
and many years ago a test,
commonly called the “Wednesbury test”, was formulated for the purpose
of determining whether a public authority had acted outside its statutory
powers.
A
decision is ‘Wednesbury Unreasonable’ if it is:
“so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”.
The test derived from: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury
Corporation [1948]
and was defined by Lord Greene as:
“so
unreasonable no reasonable body could have come to the decision”.
Lord Diplock gave a vivid explanation of ‘Wednesbury
unreasonableness’ in Council
of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985]
when he stated:
“Wednesbury
applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it”.
What
is ‘unreasonable’ will depend on the circumstances of the case. As a general
rule a decision will be unreasonable if it goes:
“beyond
the range of responses open to a reasonable decision maker”.
R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996]
Proportionality.
The Human Rights Act 1998 has added a new dimension to local authorities
decision-making and a tougher test than the test of reasonableness - one of
‘proportionality’ - looks at whether the action is proportionate to its aim.
If a local authority’s decision interferes with human rights then the courts
generally require stronger proof that the decision was reasonable.
Government guidance states that when taking enforcement
action, the issue of proportionality must be at the fore of all decision making,
as such action will by definition regulate the way in which an individual uses,
develops or occupies his land, and may well affect his home and personal life,
offending Article 8 and the First Protocol.
Proportionality means that the action taken must lead to the
minimum interference with those rights that is necessary to achieve the
authority’s wider aims. In other words, to reformulate a test that has been at
the heart of government guidance on enforcement for many years, the action taken
must be commensurate with the seriousness of the breach.
Deprivation of property.
The European Convention has regarded the payment of compensation, or the lack of
it, as an important feature in deciding whether the action of the State was
proportionate or not. The lack of compensation will lead more easily to a
conclusion that there was a lack of proportionality. This will be especially
relevant in cases of deprivation of property.
I fully recognise and respect the need for planning control in
the countryside but disproportionate enforcement action should never have been
used to wage a personal vendetta against me because of a technical breach of the
planning regulations, which was all that occurred when I carried out works of
improvement to my bungalow.
However, I was never allowed the opportunity to remedy the
technical breach and Dover District Council went far beyond what was necessary
to satisfy planning policy.
Procedural
Impropriety.
The process whereby a decision is made by a public authority must not
be undermined by ‘procedural impropriety’ and this includes a failure to
follow procedural rules, a failure to observe the rules of “natural justice”
or to act fairly towards someone.
Lord Justice Muskill, Greater London Council (1985) identified
four ways in which a decision might be procedurally improper, namely:
- Unfair behaviour towards
persons affected by the decision.
- Failure to follow a
procedure laid down by legislation.
- Failure properly to marshall
the evidence on which the decision should be based. For example, taking
into account an immaterial factor or failing to take into account a
material factor or failing to take reasonable steps to obtain the
relevant information.
- Failure to approach the
decision in the right spirit, for example, where the decision maker is actuated
by bias or where he is content to let the decision be made by chance.
How
it all Started HOME